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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court’s most recent “trilogy” of arbitration law rulings – StoltNielsen,1 Rent-A-Center2 and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion3 – deserves the lavish
attention it has been receiving, as evidenced by the contributions of Tom
Stipanowich4 and Alan Rau5 in this special issue. Professors Stipanowich and Rau
rightly view the three rulings as “of a piece,”6 revealing a determination on the
part of the Court’s majority to enhance the autonomy and effectiveness of arbitration
as a dispute resolution mechanism, even at the expense of consumer welfare. The
trilogy has the result, and most likely the purpose, of weakening safeguards that
had traditionally served to ensure the fairness of arbitral adjudication, while
keeping arbitration at a safe distance from dispute resolution on a class-wide basis.
By all accounts, the trilogy’s chief beneficiaries are those economic actors best
capable of protecting their own interests in the contracting process.7
Like past Supreme Court trilogies in the arbitration field,8 the present trilogy
represents a coordinated movement of the case law, a movement that Professors
∗ Jean Monnet Professor of European Union Law and Walter Gellhorn Professor of
Law, Columbia Law School; professeur affilié, Sciences Po, Ecole de Droit.
1
Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
2
Rent-A-Center, West v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
3
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
4
Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-ACenter, Concepcion and the Future of American Arbitration, supra in this issue at 323
[hereinafter Stipanowich].
5
Alan Scott Rau, Arbitral Power and the Limits of Contract: The New Trilogy, supra
in this issue at 435 [hereinafter Rau].
6
Rau, at 486, refers to the cases as “fit[ting] together seamlessly.” He writes, “All
three [rulings] confirm the impression of a highly politicized subject now remarkably and
tightly intertwined with wider issues of social justice and corporate power. All three are
exactly what we might expect from the current Court.” Id.
7
While Stolt-Nielsen was not a consumer case, its central and defining element was
the Court’s determination that a dispute could not proceed on a class arbitration basis
unless the underlying contract contemplated it. The Court was necessarily aware of the
fact that efforts at class arbitration are especially prominent in the consumer arbitration
context, and that whatever position it would take in Stolt-Nielsen on the availability of
class arbitration would exert its greatest effect on consumer cases.
8
What is commonly regarded as the first trilogy consisted of United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navig.
Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); and United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593 (1960). The second trilogy consisted of Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); and
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Stipanowich and Rau admirably depict. Their highly textured portrayals of the
trilogy lay out the facts of the cases and the judicial reasoning of the majority in
useful detail, while identifying, correctly in my view, their political economy
dimension. My purpose, while two-fold, is more modest. I focus first on what I
see as the shift in doctrinal premises that the trilogy entails,9 attempting to gauge
the measure of that shift. I then try to determine – again largely in doctrinal terms
– the degree to which the trilogy has narrowed the options for advocates and
courts that may be inclined to resist it. I find that, while the three decisions are
indeed of a piece, each is distinctive in the extent to which it required the Court to
turn its back on settled understandings of U.S. arbitration law. I find that the
decisions also differ in the degree to which they resolve definitively the issue
before the Court, in the sense of actually foreclosing the results they were
designed to foreclose. In short, while acknowledging the heavy impact of all three
decisions, I seek to identify precisely the magnitude of the shift in premises that
each of them entails and to measure the latitude that advocates and courts still
enjoy in the trilogy’s wake.
II. THE TRILOGY
A. Rent-A-Center
The Rent-A-Center decision, like the Concepcion decision that was to come,
targets the role of unconscionability in the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate.
The decision can be, and has been, read as according parties the freedom to
delegate to an arbitral tribunal the determination of whether the arbitration
agreement to which a delegation is attached is unconscionable10 and therefore

Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). A third
trilogy was composed of Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002);
Pacificare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003); and Green Tree Fin. Corp. v.
Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
9
“Regardless of one’s views about the wisdom of that decision, it would be hard to
dispute that AT&T Mobility and other recent United States Supreme Court decisions
represent a shift in the federal law regarding the enforceability of arbitration agreements.”
D’Antuono v. Service Road Corp., 789 F. Supp. 2d 308, 322 (D. Conn. 2011).
10
The Court specifically recognized unconscionability as a ground for denying effect
to arbitration agreements in Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 682 (1996)
(“Generally applicable contract defenses, such as . . . unconscionability, may be applied to
invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening [FAA] Section 2”). Courts have
relied extensively on unconscionability doctrine to deny enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate.
The relevant contract provision in Rent-A-Center stated:
The Arbitrator, and not any federal, state or local court or agency, shall have
exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation,
applicability, enforceability or formation of this Agreement including, but not
limited to, any claim that all or any part of this Agreement is void or voidable.
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unenforceable.11 Viewed in those terms, Rent-A-Center allows parties to reverse
the separability-based presumption in American case law, according to which
threshold challenges that specifically affect the arbitration clause are subject to
early judicial determination, while those affecting the parties’ contract as a whole
(along with the arbitration clause) are reserved for initial determination by the
arbitrators.12
Delegations to tribunals of the authority to resolve threshold issues that may
ordinarily be raised in court prior to arbitration are, as Stipanowich says,
“ubiquitous.”13 Their effect is essentially to turn what, under traditional
separability reasoning, would otherwise be “gateway” issues (hence for initial
judicial determination) into “non-gateway” issues (hence for initial determination
by arbitrators).14 Such delegations come in various stripes. The least contentious
are those that delegate to tribunals authority to determine whether a given dispute
falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement;15 these are the least contentious
because they entail contract interpretation – an exercise arbitral tribunals are
meant generally to perform. More problematic are delegations of authority to
determine whether an arbitration agreement (as distinct from the contract of which
it is a part) was ever formed16 or, if formed, binds a non-signatory.17 Similarly
contested has been the possibility of delegating to arbitrators the authority to
decide whether an agreement to arbitrate is unconscionable and, for that reason,
11

Professor Stipanowich describes the decision in Rent-A-Center as one in which
“public policies promoting enforcement of arbitration agreements effectively trump the
authority of courts . . . to police arbitration agreements for unconscionability.” Stipanowich,
at 326.
12
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 398 (1967);
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
13
Stipanowich, at 347. According to established Supreme Court case law, parties
may delegate to arbitrators the decision whether an arbitration agreement covers a
particular dispute. AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America,
475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986). Even the decision whether a contract exists and/or is binding
on a given non-signatory is delegable, provided the delegation is expressed clearly and
unmistakably. First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995). For criticism,
see Steven H. Reisberg, The Rules Governing Who Decides Jurisdictional Issues: First
Options v. Kaplan Revisited, 20 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 159, 159-60 (2009).
14
See generally, George A. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem in International
Commercial Arbitration, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2012).
15
See AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S.
643 (1986).
16
In China Minmetals Materials Import & Exp. Co. v. Chi Mei Corp., 334 F.3d 274
(3d Cir. 2003), the court did not decide whether authority to decide the existence of a
contract could be delegated to the arbitrators. But it did hold that the question is generally
for a court rather than a tribunal to decide, even though the existence question pertained to
the contract as a whole rather than to its arbitration provision in particular.
17
First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995) (allowing authority to
determine whether a non-signatory is bound to be delegated to the arbitral tribunal, if the
intention to delegate is clear and unambiguous).
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unworthy of enforcement. The latter question has taken on heightened importance
as unconscionability has emerged as the prime doctrinal basis for denying effect to
arbitration agreements in consumer contracts.18 The Court granted certiorari in the
Rent-A-Center case precisely to resolve this question and, according to a widely
held view, gave its blessing to delegations of this sort.
I suggest that the Court did not in fact quite settle the issue. Rather than
decide whether parties may delegate to arbitrators the question of an arbitration
agreement’s conscionability or unconscionability, the Court ruled that the
consumer challenging the delegation in Rent-A-Center had not in fact directed his
arguments to the delegation provision in particular, but instead had targeted the
arbitration agreement as a whole. On that descriptive basis, the majority then
invoked the separability doctrine – a notion designed to distinguish between an
arbitration agreement and the contract as a whole – deploying it as a means of
distinguishing between a specific feature of an arbitration agreement and the
arbitration clause generally. Because the consumer had invoked defects applicable
to the arbitration agreement as a whole, he was not entitled to mount a threshold
judicial challenge to the delegation. The validity of the delegation would
accordingly be determined by the tribunal to which the delegation had been made.
The majority’s use of the separability doctrine was of course completely
disingenuous. Separability has no place within the four corners of the arbitration
agreement itself. The justification for employing the separability doctrine to
define arbitral jurisdiction in the first place is that when a party challenges an
arbitration agreement on the basis of defects unique to it, it challenges the arbitral
tribunal’s authority to decide anything, and not least the validity of the very
agreement from which the tribunal purports to derive that authority; it does not
invite the court to make a judgment about either the meaning or validity of the
contract as a whole – issues that, because they implicate the merits of a dispute,
fall to the arbitrators to decide, assuming of course that the arbitration agreement
is otherwise valid and enforceable. Importing separability into the interstices of
the arbitration agreement serves no comparable purpose and has no comparable
justification. The validity of an arbitration agreement as a whole is no more a
merits issue than the validity of that agreement’s delegation provision. In sum,
there is no reason in logic or principle why a party challenging an agreement to
arbitrate should be required to confine its challenge to one particular feature of the
arbitration agreement and avoid leveling attacks on any of its other features or on
the arbitration agreement as a whole. Put still more simply, the majority’s use of
18

See generally Stipanowich, at 352, and cases cited therein. See also Karen Cross,
Letting the Arbitrator Decide Unconscionability Challenges, 26 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL.
1 (2011); Charles L. Knapp, Blowing the Whistle on Mandatory Arbitration:
Unconscionability as a Signaling Device, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 609 (2009); Susan
Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability,
52 BUFF. L. REV. 185 (2004); Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the
Unconscionability Doctrine: How the California Courts are Circumventing the Federal
Arbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 39 (2006).
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the separability doctrine in Rent-A-Center is nothing less than a perversion of it,
and the fallacy of the maneuver was not lost upon the dissenting justices.
Frustrating though the Rent-A-Center ruling may be, the Court did not in the
end squarely decide whether the parties to an arbitration agreement may validly
delegate to an arbitral tribunal the question of the conscionability of an arbitration
agreement. To be sure, the majority held that a party challenging a delegation of
the unconscionability question must confine itself to the delegation,19 and a
challenger who confines an unconscionability attack to features specific to the
delegation admittedly faces a very uphill battle establishing unconscionability –
much more uphill than would be the case if it could attack all features of the
arbitration agreement viewed collectively.20
Even assuming the majority’s use of separability to be apt, it was mistaken.
Suppose, for example, that an arbitration clause, besides containing a delegation
provision, also (a) designates as the place of arbitration the merchant’s place of
business, rather than the domicile of the consumer (“a situs provision”), (b)
dispenses with any requirement of oral hearings (“a ‘documents-only’ provision”)
and (c) bars discovery in aid of any arbitration pursuant to the arbitration
agreement (“a ‘no-discovery’ provision”). Suppose further that a consumer
challenging the delegation provision as unconscionable also, and at the same time,
independently challenges the other three provisions (the situs provision, the
“documents-only” provision, and the “no-discovery” provision) as
unconscionable. In that scenario, the unconscionability challenge is admittedly
not confined to the delegation.21 But the reason why an invalidity challenge under
traditional separability doctrine ends up being reserved initially for the arbitrators,
and not a court, is that the same considerations that lead to invalidity of the
arbitration clause under that particular challenge would necessarily also lead to
invalidity of the entire contract – a “merits” determination that is properly for the
tribunal, and not the court, to make. But, in my example, the same considerations
that might lead to invalidity of the delegation provision would not necessarily lead
to invalidity of the situs provision, the “documents-only” provision, or the “nodiscovery” provision, much less the invalidity of the arbitration agreement it its
entirety. The unconscionability of the delegation provision neither implies nor
presupposes the unconscionability of the three other provisions, or of the
19

Professor Stipanowich reads Rent-A-Center as establishing that “[f]rom now on, the
presence of clear ‘delegation’ language in arbitration agreements will mean that the
judicial ‘gatekeeper’ role is limited to consideration of defenses specifically aimed at the
delegation provision itself.” Stipanowich, at 367. After Rent-A-Center, parties that fail
to confine their challenge to the delegation provision as such are ordinarily required to
present that challenge to the arbitrators. See, e.g., Womack v. Career Educ. Corp., 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138699 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 2, 2011).
20
In Howard v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76342 (E.D. Tenn. July
28, 2010), the party resisting arbitration convinced the court that her attacks were all
specific to the delegation provision rather than the arbitration clause as a whole. She was
thus permitted to present that challenge to the court, though she lost on the merits.
21
See Stipanowich, at 365.
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arbitration agreement as a whole. The reason for this is that, at least in most U.S.
jurisdictions, the substantive prong of any unconscionability analysis depends
entirely on the fairness of the particular provision in question.22
The point becomes even clearer if we imagine that a consumer clearly did
what the consumer in Rent-A-Center may have thought he had done, namely
challenge the delegation provision in an arbitration agreement and, in so doing,
merely make reference to the three other provisions, without, however, mounting
an unconscionability attack on any of them. Suppose, more particularly, that the
consumer expressly refers to those other provisions in his or her challenge for the
limited and sole purpose of underscoring the stakes of the delegation provision,
i.e. to demonstrate that the delegation is a highly consequential one, thus all the
more unconscionable. After all, a delegation provision can be more or less serious
depending on the number and the magnitude of issues that, by virtue of that
provision, end up being delegated. A consumer who alleges that a delegation
provision, if upheld, would transfer from a court to a tribunal other weighty issues
concerning the fairness of the arbitration agreement does not cease to challenge
the delegation provision only. The fact of the matter is that the court, if allowed
to do so, could find the delegation provision to be unconscionable in light of the
stakes (as evidenced, at least in part, by the other three provisions), without
necessarily finding that any of these other provisions is itself unconscionable.23 In
22

Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 114, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 745, 767, 6 P.3d 669, 690 (2002); Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807,
171 Cal. Rptr. 604, 623 P.2d 165 (1981). See generally David Horton, Unconscionability
Wars, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 13 (2011).
The case of Washington v. William Morris Endeavor Entertainment, LLC, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 81346 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2011), illustrates well how little Rent-A-Center can
be relied on to bar challenges to the unconscionability of a provision delegating to
arbitrators the determination of an arbitration agreement’s unconscionability. The party
resisting arbitration there was found to have specifically mentioned the delegation
provision only once in the course of its argument that the arbitration agreement was
“unfair, one-sided, and the product of undue influence.” The district court nevertheless
interpreted the challenge as targeting the delegation provision and proceeded to address it
on the merits. On the merits, however, the court found the delegation provision not to be
unconscionable. See note 25, infra.
23
Professor Stipanowich concludes:
A party seeking to avoid arbitration will not be able to bring before a court any of
a litany of concerns about other elements of the arbitration agreement – those
relating to costs, discovery, nature and location of hearings, form of award, kind
of remedies, etc. – unless they can be shown to have an impact on the validity of
the delegation provision.
Stipanowich, at 368. Arguably, such other features do heighten the impact of the
delegation provision.
This is consistent with the view expressed by Professor Rau to the effect that courts
may justifiably “atten[d] to individual hardship, permitting a tailored effort that is aimed at
minimizing interference both with federal policy and the concerns of private autonomy.”
Rau, at 548.
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fact, the majority opinion in Rent-A-Center contains language that supports this
very interpretation.24 Even so, a showing of unconscionability of the delegation
provision will ultimately be very difficult,25 though not necessarily impossible,26
to establish.
Strained though it may appear, the analysis I offer here would lessen the
impact of Rent-A-Center on challenges to delegations to tribunals of authority to
determine the conscionability or unconscionability of an arbitration agreement.
The fact that a party challenges several discrete components of an arbitration
clause (including a delegation provision) does not mean that the challenge to the
delegation provision is not unique. Moreover, a party should be entitled to
strengthen its challenge to a provision delegating authority to arbitrators to
determine the unconscionability of an arbitration agreement by invoking
provisions of that agreement other than the delegation clause, without being seen
as challenging those other provisions directly.
The question of course remains as to how, if and when the courts do agree to
address a challenge to the delegation of authority to decide the question of
unconscionability, they will decide that question. There is Supreme Court case
law suggesting that such a delegation, if established, will ordinarily be upheld. In
the First Options case, the Supreme Court held that parties may, if they do so
clearly and unmistakably, delegate to arbitrators the question whether a contract
binds a non-signatory.27 Thus, under First Options, even a party that steadfastly
insists that it is a stranger to an agreement may, by virtue of clear and
unmistakable language in the contract, find itself having given a tribunal primary
24

“[H]ad [the consumer] challenged the delegation provision by arguing that . . .
common procedures as applied to the delegation provision rendered that provision
unconscionable, the challenge should have been considered by the court.” 130 S. Ct. at
2780 (emphasis added). One lower court relied precisely on this language to examine the
conscionability of an arbitration agreement, a delegation provision notwithstanding. Quilloin
v. Tenet Healthsystem Philadelphia, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 707, 723 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
25
In Washington v. William Morris Endeavor Entertainment, LLC, supra note 22, the
district court determined the conscionability of the delegation provision in an arbitration
agreement, even though the challenger had not exclusively targeted that aspect of the
agreement. The party resisting arbitration argued that the delegation provision was
unconscionable because it “leaves no room for judicial review of the [arbitral] decision.”
The court rightly rejected that argument on the ground that the delegation provision itself
did not and could not have any impact on the authority of a court to vacate the eventual
award. (The court also determined that the provision was not procedurally unconscionable
because the party resisting arbitration had not attempted to negotiate the terms of the
Agreement and because a contract is not procedurally unconscionable merely because it
was offered on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis and not subject to negotiation).
26
In Morocho v. Carnival Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4316 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 14,
2011), the party resisting arbitration evidently confined his attack to the delegation
provision, and yet succeeded in having it declared unconscionable. Unfortunately, the
decision offers little if any reasoning, largely because it merely adopts a magistrate’s
report and recommendation to that effect.
27
First Options, supra note 17.
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authority to answer that very question. In its Granite Rock decision,28 the Court
similarly suggested that parties may delegate to a tribunal the question whether the
main agreement was ever formed in the first place, again provided the agreement
so provides.
However, the question in Rent-A-Center pertained to the alleged
unconscionability not of the main contract, but of the arbitration clause itself, or a
part of it. Generally speaking, challenges that target the existence of an arbitration
agreement itself are thought to go directly enough to the issue of consent that they
should be decided by a court rather than an arbitral tribunal – the reason being that
a tribunal derives its very being from the clause whose existence is in question.29
If that is so, it would not require a great leap also to treat as unenforceable a
delegation to arbitrators of the power to determine the unconscionability of the
arbitration clause – at least if one views unconscionability as seriously implicating
consent.30 That is the question that the majority in Rent-A-Center left unresolved
and that remains ultimately to be decided.
But there is a further reason, with even broader consequences, why Rent-ACenter may not put an end to challenges to delegations of authority to arbitrators
to determine the conscionability or unconscionability of an arbitration agreement.
Often overlooked in Rent-A-Center is the fact that the majority analyzed the main
contract as containing two arbitration clauses, not one. The potential significance
of that fact may not have been apparent at the time, but some lower courts have
seized upon it to distinguish Rent-A-Center from the cases at hand, holding that
where the delegation provision is part and parcel of the agreement to arbitrate, no
distinction may be drawn between them, and no separability argument can
therefore be made.31 A party resisting arbitration presumably then becomes free
28

Granite Rock Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010).
On the close affinity between the question of whether a delegation is “real” and the
principle of consent, see Rau, at 497 et seq.
30
See Justice Stevens’ dissent in Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2784 (delegation of
authority to determine the conscionability of an arbitration agreement directly implicates
consent). Professor Rau believes that whether or not determining the unconscionability of
an arbitration agreement is assimilable to determining the existence of the arbitration
agreement – and, like it, non-delegable – depends on the circumstances. Rau, at 503 (“Is
it the case that the asserted ‘unconscionability’ of an arbitration clause should be taken to
impair the willingness of the parties to arbitrate the matter? Pretty clearly the answer is the
reliably infuriating ‘maybe.’”).
31
Quilloin v. Tenet Healthsystem Philadelphia, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 707, 722-23
(E.D. Pa. 2011):
However, in Rent-A-Center, there were two agreements to arbitrate, the first to
arbitrate employment disputes, and the second to arbitrate disputes as to the
unconscionability of the first (the “delegation provision”). Under the Prima Paint
framework, the Supreme Court found that the agreement to arbitrate employment
disputes constituted the contract as a whole, while the delegation provision
constituted a separate agreement to arbitrate. Therefore, the Court concluded that
it could only consider the validity of the delegation provision, and could not
29
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to challenge any and all aspects of the arbitration agreement together, and not
merely the delegation provision (or any other single provision of the arbitration
agreement) in isolation – precisely the result the Rent-A-Center majority sought to
foreclose.

reach the validity of the broader agreement. Because Jackson had addressed his
agreements to the unconscionability of the contract as a whole, the Court referred
his claims to arbitration.
The contract at issue in this case does not resemble the contract at issue in RentA-Center. In Rent-A-Center, there were two clear agreements to arbitrate, one to
arbitrate employment disputes, one to arbitrate challenges to the validity of the
agreement. There is no such agreement to arbitrate challenges to the validity of
the agreement in this case. Rather, there is a single agreement to arbitrate, and
challenges to that agreement to arbitrate can be decided by judges as before
under the Prima Paint line of cases.
...
Thus Plaintiff's challenges to the various provisions of the [arbitration agreement]
constitute challenges to the agreement to arbitrate, which are for a court to
decide.
By no means have all cases since Rent-A-Center adopted this analysis. For some
courts, the placement of the delegation provision – whether within the arbitration clause or
separate from it – makes no difference:
Pre-Rent-A-Center, a contract was divided into two parts: (1) the arbitration
clause; (2) the rest of the contract. Under this system, courts decided claims that
an arbitration clause was invalid or unenforceable. However, claims that the
entire contract was invalid were left for arbitration. Therefore, a plaintiff could
argue: “these limitations on discovery make it unconscionable to force me to
arbitrate my discrimination claim.” However, claims that he was fraudulently
induced to enter into the contract as a whole were relegated to arbitration.
Post-Rent-A-Center, the line has shifted. Now, the same contract, if it contains a
delegation clause, is divided into: (1) the delegation clause; (2) the rest of the
contract. Under this new system, if the contract contains a delegation clause,
courts decide only if the delegation clause is valid and enforceable. Arbitrators
decide claims relating to the underlying contract, plus those related to the rest of
the arbitration clause. For example, the plaintiff can argue: “these limitations on
discovery make it unconscionable to force me to arbitrate my claim that the
arbitration agreement is void and unenforceable.” However, he can no longer
argue: “these limitations on discovery make it unconscionable to force me to
arbitrate my discrimination claim.”
As prescribed by Rent-A-Center, this Court must examine Plaintiff's claims to see
if he challenges the Arbitration Agreement as a whole, or the Delegation Clause
itself.
Sajay Rai v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93196, at *9-11 (E.D. Mich.
Sept. 8, 2010). See also Madrigal v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
134347, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2010) (the result in Rent-A-Center did not turn on the
fact that the agreement was a “stand-alone” arbitration agreement).
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B. Stolt-Nielsen
Upholding the parties’ right to delegate the unconscionability question to the
arbitrators is only one means available to a majority of the Court for enhancing the
autonomy and efficacy of the arbitral process. Arguably, another means would be
to permit arbitrations to proceed on a class-action basis. Prima facie, class
arbitration stands to bring to arbitration advantages comparable to those that class
actions have brought to litigation. The Supreme Court majority in Stolt-Nielsen,
however, held otherwise, finding that, far from promoting arbitration’s basic
purposes, class arbitration offended them. To reach that result, the Court had no
choice but to drive a thick wedge between arbitration, on the one hand, and class
arbitration, on the other.
The majority in Stolt-Nielsen essentially held that class arbitration is not
merely a distinctive species of arbitration, but practically an altogether different
genus.32 To be sure, class arbitration is no less distinctive from garden-variety
bilateral arbitration than class-action litigation is from garden-variety bilateral
litigation.33 But the Court found class arbitration to be more than merely
distinctive from arbitration generally; it found class arbitration to be virtually
antithetical to it. It is of course understandable that the Court would display
caution in reading consent to class arbitration into consent to arbitration. U.S.
courts did not embrace class-action litigation entirely on their own. They did so
only after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure – for all practical purposes a
federal statute – specifically authorized federal courts to entertain litigation in that
aggregate form. Just as class-action litigation was seen as differing sufficiently
from ordinary litigation to warrant specific authorization by statute, so too could
class arbitration be viewed as differing sufficiently from ordinary commercial
arbitration to warrant authorization by party agreement.
But creating that much distance between class arbitration and arbitration
generally required the Court to retreat from some basic and longstanding axioms
of the law of arbitration, as understood in the U.S. Ironically, all these axioms

32

“[T]he differences between bilateral and class-action arbitration are too great for
arbitrators to presume, consistent with their limited powers under the FAA, that the
parties’ mere silence on the issue of class-action arbitration constitutes consent to resolve
their disputes in class proceedings.” Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1776. The majority cited
(1) the large number of disputes commonly embraced in class arbitration, (2) the lack of
privacy and confidentiality that class arbitration would entail, (3) the impact on absent
class members, and (4) the ordinarily high commercial stakes. Id.
33
See, e.g., Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 1993); Amer. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Cas.
Co., 951 F.2d 107, 108 (6th Cir. 1991). It is true that most courts prior to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003), treated the
question of consolidation of multi-party disputes involving multiple contracts as a matter
for judicial determination, on the understanding that the consent of the parties was
implicated. See Stipanowich, at 334.
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reflect the very pro-arbitration philosophy that the Stolt-Nielsen majority itself
purported to vindicate.34
A first corollary of U.S. law’s general pro-arbitration stance is the proposition
that arbitrators enjoy broad latitude in determining the procedural contours of an
arbitration, insofar as the contracting parties have not prescribed otherwise. In
Stolt-Nielsen, the parties had neither expressly embraced nor rejected class
arbitration; the agreement was silent on the matter, precisely the circumstance in
which arbitrators are ordinarily permitted to make independent procedural
determinations. It is difficult to reconcile the Court’s position in Stolt-Nielsen
with the U.S. judiciary’s many pronouncements over the years in favor of arbitral
discretion on matters of procedure. The majority facilitated this move by
effectively placing class arbitration largely beyond the perimeter of what
ordinarily passes for arbitration. In the process it also abandoned its suggestion in
the case of Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle that whether the parties
contemplated class arbitration constituted a “procedural question growing out of
the dispute,” thus one for the tribunal primarily to resolve.35
A second corollary of the pro-arbitration stance of U.S. law is the notion that
arbitration agreements are to be interpreted broadly. Consequently, a court, faced
with an arbitration clause that could be understood as embracing class arbitration
arguably should be willing to understand it as doing so. But what the Court said
instead in Stolt-Nielsen, and would later reaffirm in AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion,36 is that arbitration and class arbitration are in fact so different in
kind that parties should not be held to have contemplated the latter merely by
having contemplated the former.
According to a third corollary of the pro-arbitration policy underlying U.S.
arbitration law, the interpretation of a contract, including its arbitration clause, is
primarily a matter for the arbitrators. To be sure, this deference to the arbitrators
does not extend to all issues. Ordinarily, gateway issues, such as whether an
arbitration agreement was ever formed, whether a party against whom an
arbitration agreement is invoked is indeed bound by it, or whether any given
dispute is among those that the parties intended to submit to arbitration, are not
ones on which deference is a priori owed to the arbitrators. But otherwise deference
largely obtains. Accordingly, courts should refrain from announcing a limiting
rule of contract interpretation intended to bind the arbitrators. Yet that is precisely
what the majority in Stolt-Nielsen did when it apparently ruled that contracts that are
silent with respect to class arbitration must be understood as not authorizing it.
34

See generally Richard Nagareda, The Litigation-Arbitration Dichotomy Meets the
Class Action, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1069 (2011); Stacie I. Strong, The Sounds of Silence:
Are U.S. Arbitrators Creating Internationally Enforceable Awards When Ordering Class
Arbitration in Cases of Contractual Silence or Ambiguity?, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1017 (2009).
35
539 U.S. 444 (2003). The category of procedural issues that are presumptively for
arbitrators to resolve was established by the Court in Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
36
See Section C, infra.
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Fourth, and most fundamentally, arbitration agreements, like contracts
generally, are subject to interpretation – whether by courts or arbitrators – in
accordance with the substantive rules of the relevant contract law, typically state
contract law.37 But the rule of contract interpretation that the Court announced in
Stolt-Nielsen is plainly not a substantive rule of the applicable state law of
contract; it is a substantive rule of federal law, and more particularly a federal
arbitration law largely of the Court’s own making. As the Court’s subsequent
decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion would show, substitution of federal for
state law on the question of whether a given arbitration agreement permits class
arbitration can be entirely outcome-determinative.38
Finally, regardless of the correctness of its position as a matter of substantive
contract law, the Court in Stolt-Nielsen made a legally dubious move in vacating
the tribunal’s clause construction award. The Court essentially vacated the award
for legal error – namely error that consisted of interpreting an arbitration
agreement in a manner inconsistent with the federal rule of contract interpretation
disfavoring class arbitration that the Court announced in Stolt-Nielsen itself.39
This move is all the more curious in view of the Court’s emphatic assertion,
elsewhere in the Stolt-Nielsen opinion itself, that legal error – even “serious” legal
error40 – is not a valid ground for vacatur of an award.41 Moreover, as Professor
Rau points out,42 the majority’s suggestion that the tribunal was required, on pain
of vacatur, to “[inquire] whether the FAA, maritime law, or New York law
contains a ‘default rule’ under which an arbitration clause is construed as allowing
37

In Stolt-Nielsen, the Court effectively admitted that contract interpretation was
subject to state law. 130 S. Ct. at 1773, quoting Volt Info. Servs. v. Bd. of Trustees of
Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989). I do not agree with Professor Rau’s apparent
suggestion that the state contract law referred to in FAA § 2 “merely qualifies and gives
full meaning to a federal right: identifying what will best serve federal policy is essential
simply in order to spin out the dimensions of this right – which remains a matter of
national concern, ‘precisely because Congress has dealt with it.’” Rau, at 529 (citation
omitted).
38
Professor Stipanowich refers to “the wellspring of divined ‘federal substantive law’
under the FAA.” Stipanowich, at 326. In fact, the case law on this point is well
established. See Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) ; Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1, 11-12 (1984).
39
Professor Stipanowich refers to “the rare spectacle of the nation’s high court
directing vacatur of a commercial arbitration award.” Stipanowich, at 340.
The majority more specifically ruled that, assuming the “manifest disregard of the
law” standard for vacatur to be intact, that standard was met because the tribunal failed to
base its clause construction award on any particular body of law, but rather on its own
policy preference for class arbitration.
40
130 S. Ct. at 1767.
41
Porzig v. Dresdner, Kleinwort, Benson, N. Am., LLC, 497 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2007);
D.H. Blair, & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2006). See generally Note, Judicial
Review of Arbitration Awards on the Merits, 63 HARV. L. REV. 681 (1950).
42
Rau, at 472.
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class arbitration in the absence of express consent” is far removed from our usual
understandings of international arbitration. Arbitral tribunals are not generally
required, as a matter of law, to search for applicable default rules or otherwise
satisfy reviewing courts that they fully identified and articulated the basis of their
reasoning and refrained from expansive contract interpretations, on pain of
vacatur. Nor should they be required to do so, if arbitration is to be a fully
functioning alternative to litigation.
I emphasize all of this merely to underscore the extent to which the Supreme
Court majority was prepared to go in Stolt-Nielsen in order to render it unlikely
that arbitrations conducted in the United States would proceed along classarbitration lines. Achieving that result necessitated departures from several of
U.S. arbitration law’s most fundamental precepts – departures that the majority
was not even willing to acknowledge.
Notwithstanding the apparent boldness of the Stolt-Nielsen decision, one
cannot correctly gauge its significance without considering the role played in that
decision by the parties’ express stipulation that their agreement was silent on the
matter of class arbitration.43 It is far from certain how bound lower courts will feel
to read an agreement as precluding class arbitration merely because it contains no
express language on the subject.44 Some courts have taken that position,45 but it
appears that even more have not.46 Thus, subsequent to Stolt-Nielsen numerous
43

130 S. Ct. at 1776. As Professor Rau rightly points out, it is likely that the parties
merely meant to stipulate that the arbitration agreement failed to mention class arbitration
expressly, not that they never contemplated or could have intended class arbitration. See
Rau, at 457, claiming that the majority in Stolt-Nielsen “ran away with” the stipulation.
44
Justice Ginsburg, dissenting in Stolt-Nielsen, stressed that the Court’s ruling did not
establish that consent to class arbitration necessarily had to be express. 130 S. Ct. at 1783.
Although Professor Rau sees ample room for accommodating class arbitration even if the
agreement is literally silent on the issue, he expresses some skepticism that courts will
allow the evident purpose of the majority in Stolt-Nielsen to be so easily circumvented.
Rau, at 478, suggesting that, to achieve that result, will require “some heavy lifting indeed.”
45
Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co, 785 F. Supp. 2d 394, 404-05 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (agreement to class arbitration cannot be simply inferred); Sanders v. Forex Capital
Mkts, LLC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137961, at *28 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2011) (consumer
must arbitrate his claims and “must do so on an individual basis, as there is no provision in
the contract which contemplates class arbitration”); In re California Title Ins. Antitrust
Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71621, at *13 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2011) (court cannot order
arbitration to proceed on a class-wide basis unless arbitration clause contains a provision
for class-wide resolution of claims); Quinonez v. Empire Today, LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 117393, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2010) (company that wanted a class arbitration
should have written a provision that explicitly contemplated it).
46
Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115534, at *10 (D. N.J.
Oct. 6, 2011) (class arbitration not necessarily foreclosed merely because arbitration
agreement is silent on the issue); Botello v. COI Telecom, LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
138572, at *16 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 30, 2010) (same); Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans LLC,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17123, at *12-16 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 2011) (arbitrator could
reasonably find consent to class arbitration even if agreement is silent on the issue); La.
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courts have been willing to accept (or, more accurately, allow arbitrators to
accept) evidence of consent to class arbitration in sources extrinsic to the
arbitration agreement, provided the applicable state law of contract so permits,47
or to conclude more or less summarily that the arbitrator had the discretion under
state contract law to find that class arbitration was within the parties’
contemplation.48 The courts’ latitude to do so is of course not unlimited. And any
Health Serv. Indemnity Co. v. Gambro, 756 F. Supp. 2d 760, 768 (W.D. La. 2010)
(arbitral tribunal applied legal principles, not their own policy choices, in finding action
could proceed on a class basis); Aracri v. Dillard’s, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41596, at
*9-10 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2011) (Stolt-Nielsen distinguishable on account of parties’
stipulation that the agreement was silent on class arbitration); Yahoo! Inc. v. Iversen, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117149, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2011) (interpretation of an
arbitration agreement is generally a matter of state law, and state law generally permits a
decision-maker to “look beyond the four corners of the contract where appropriate”);
Hayes v. Servicemaster Global Holdings Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70160, at *12 n.3
(N.D. Cal. June 29, 2011) (arbitration clause need not explicitly mention that the parties
agree to class arbitration in order for a decision-maker to find that they did so consent);
Angermann v. General Steel Domestic Sales, LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123145, at *6
(D. Colo., Nov. 8, 2010) (although there is nothing in a contract to suggest that the parties
contemplated class-wide arbitration, the question whether class-wide arbitration is
appropriate is for the arbitrator); Southern Communications Servs., Inc. v. Thomas, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131344, at *33-34 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 3, 2011) (to hold that an arbitrator
should automatically assume the parties intended to preclude class arbitration whenever
class proceedings are not explicitly authorized in writing would require the court to ignore
the arbitrator’s duty to apply a rule of law governing contract interpretation to determine
the parties’ intent); Bergman v. Spruce Peak Realty, LLC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131366,
at *11-13 (D. Vt. Nov. 14, 2011) (arbitration agreement may contain an implicit
authorization of class arbitration).
47
For a leading example, see Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., 646 F.3d 113, 124 (2d
Cir. 2011) (arbitrator acted within scope of her authority and within the bounds of state
contract law in construing a contract to permit class arbitration; authorization of class
arbitration need not be expressly stated in the arbitration agreement in order to be found
consistent with the parties’ intentions).
On the Jock case, see Rau, at 460 nn.88-89. See also Christopher R. Drahozal &
Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, 94 MARQUETTE L. REV. 1103, 1155 (2011).
48
See, e.g., Smith & Wollensky Rest. Group, Inc. v. Passow, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4495, at *3-4 (D. Mass. Jan. 18, 2011), stating:
In Stolt-Nielsen, “the parties stipulated that there was ‘no agreement’ on the issue
of class-action arbitration.” Here, there was no such stipulation and . . . [the]
arbitrator ruled that the parties intended that class-action claims and relief were
contemplated and permitted by the [arbitration agreement] and the Court
concludes that the language of the [agreement] supports such a ruling.
The arbitrator found that the arbitration clause . . . was broad in its reach,
covering “any claim that, in the absence of this Agreement, would be resolved in
a court of law under applicable state and federal law.” The arbitrator noted that
“any claim” is defined as “any claims for wages, compensation and benefits” and
that both the FLSA and Massachusetts wage laws statutorily authorize an
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court that adopts such an approach does so in the shadow of a possible reversal by
an appellate court that is more responsive to the Supreme Court majority’s evident
hostility to finding consent to class arbitration in the absence of real evidence to
the contrary.
C. Concepcion
I have sought thus far to demonstrate that, however strong their messages, the
majority opinion in Rent-A-Center does not foreclose all possibility of defeating a
delegation to arbitrators of authority to determine the conscionability or
unconscionability of an agreement to arbitrate and the majority opinion in StoltNielsen did not shut the door entirely on reading contracts as authorizing class
arbitration even when containing no express language to that effect.
It is more difficult to read the third decision in the trilogy – AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion – quite so indulgently. There, a majority of the Court squarely
rejected, as contrary to the Federal Arbitration Act, and indeed preempted by it,
California case law declaring class-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts to be
unconscionable and unenforceable.49 The majority justified this result on the
individual employee to bring a class-action in a court of law. The arbitrator
further found that the [agreement] expressly provided that the “[a]rbitrator may
award any remedy and relief as a court could award on the same claim,” that the
applicable statutes provide for class relief and the statutes were in existence when
the DRA was executed. The arbitrator also noted that “wage and hour claims like
those in play here are frequently pursued as class or collective actions, and both
[parties] must be deemed to understand that.”
The arbitrator’s award was the result of a reasonable interpretation of the
[agreement]. Given this Court’s limited standard of review, such interpretation
must stand.
49
Section 2 of the FAA reads “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.”
Following Stolt-Nielsen, the Second Circuit in In re American Express Merchants’
Litigation, 634 F.3d 187 (2d. Cir. 2011), held a class-action waiver to be unenforceable
because “effectively depriving plaintiffs of the statutory protections of the antitrust laws,”
due to individual arbitration being prohibitively expensive. The Second Circuit relied on
Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000), requiring a party
challenging an arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration would be prohibitively
expensive to prove that fact.
On the conscionability or unconscionability of class-arbitration waivers, see
Alexander J. Casey, Arbitration Nation: Wireless Service Providers and Class Arbitration
Waivers, 6 WASH. J. LAW, TECH. & ARTS 15 (2010); Yongdam Li, Applying the Doctrine
of Unconscionability to Employment Arbitration Agreements, with Emphasis on Class
Arbitration/Arbitration Waivers, 31 WHITTIER L. REV. 665 (2010); Shelley McGill,
Consumer Arbitration Clause Enforcement: A Balanced Legislative Response, 47 AM.
BUS. L.J. 361 (2010); William H. Baker, Class Action Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFL.
RESOL. 335 (2009); Heather Bromfield, The Denial of Relief: The Enforcement of Class
Action Waivers in Arbitration Agreements, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 315 (2009).
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ground that applying California unconscionability doctrine in that fashion
operated to discriminate against arbitration in violation of the FAA, in part by
denying effect to a feature of the arbitration agreement (viz. the class-action
waiver) to which the parties subscribed.50 The ruling has wider significance than
may at first appear. It has been cited for the general proposition that “the
unavailability of class arbitration . . . is not a ground for a finding of substantive
unconscionability,” even in cases that do not involve class-arbitration waivers,51
as well as in cases involving other arbitration clause features in combination with
class-action waivers.52
For all its assertiveness, the Concepcion ruling, like Rent-A-Center and StoltNielsen, is both logically flawed and at odds with established understandings of
U.S. arbitration law. Logically, the decision was not even necessary. The Court’s
purpose in Stolt-Nielsen had been precisely to ensure that class arbitration would
not take place in the absence of substantial affirmative evidence that the parties
specifically contemplated it. If Stolt-Nielsen were to accomplish that purpose –
that is, if courts in fact were seldom to conclude that an arbitration agreement
authorizes class arbitration – waivers of class arbitration would have no real
relevance, much less utility. Few if any consumer contracts contain the positive
language inviting class arbitration that Stolt-Nielsen arguably requires, and they
are even less likely to do so in the future. In short, the Court in Concepcion took
the policy underlying Stolt-Nielsen not only to new, but also to unnecessary
lengths.
But, like Rent-A-Center and Stolt-Nielsen, Concepcion is also at variance with
established understandings in U.S. arbitration law. The principal argument that the
majority gave for upholding class-arbitration waivers is that class arbitration’s
Many courts, including in California, have used the contract-law doctrine of
unconscionability to deny enforcement to arbitration agreements or certain of their terms.
See, e.g., Lowden v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 512 F.3d 1213, 1219-21 (9th Cir. 2008); Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893-95 (9th Cir. 2002); Tillman v. Commercial
Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 369-70, 372-73 (N.C. 2008); Armendariz v. Found.
Health Psychcare Servs., 6 P.3d 669, 680-90 (Cal. 2000).
50
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747. For decisions following the rule in Concepcion,
see, for example, Litman v. Cellco Pshp., 655 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2011); Green v. Super
Shuttle Int’l, Inc., 653 F.3d 766 (8th Cir. 2011); Jones v. DirecTV, Inc., 2011 U.S. App.
LEXIS 23586 (11th Cir. Nov. 22, 2011); Valle v. Lowe’s HIW, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 93639 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2011); King v. Advance America, Cash Advance,
Centers, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98630 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2011); AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Bernardi, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124084 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2011); Day v.
Persels & Assocs., LLC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49231 (M.D. Fla. May 9, 2011); Bernal
v. Burnett, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1280 (D. Colo. 2011).
51
Sanders v. Forex Capital Markets, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137961, at*17 (S.D.
N.Y. Nov. 29, 2011).
52
Antkowiak v. Taxmasters, Inc., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS (3d Cir. Dec. 22, 2011)
(Concepcion ruling applicable to provisions requiring consumer to bear all costs of
arbitration).
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principal features are antithetical to arbitration’s core purpose of avoiding the
complexity, expense and delay commonly associated with litigation.53 But, as the
Supreme Court held in its seminal Volt decision,54 and has frequently reiterated
since, the Federal Arbitration Act does not embody a commitment to any single
idealized model of arbitration, even a streamlined and efficient one. The FAA
does not, in other words, dictate arbitral design.55 Despite Justice Scalia’s
suggestion that class arbitration might not even be arbitration at all,56 an arbitral
proceeding may well be more, rather than less, resource-intensive – i.e., complex,
expensive and prolonged – and still constitute arbitration.
Of course, as the Court rightly observes, parties cannot be required by state
law to adopt for their arbitration full-blown pretrial discovery or jury trials.57
Parties have the right to dispense with those adjudicatory features if they wish,
and they regularly do, albeit most often only through incorporation of institutional
rules or otherwise implicitly. For a state to make their availability non-waivable
would deprive contracting parties of the right effectively to opt for an arbitration
of their own procedural design, as is their prerogative.
But does it follow that a state also may not make a party’s entitlement to class
arbitration (assuming it to be so entitled under a fair reading of the arbitration
agreement) non-waivable? In my view, it does not. The fact that the FAA does
not allow states to impose pretrial discovery and jury trials in arbitration does not
mean, and should not mean, that states cannot override party agreements that
would deprive arbitration of its basic fairness. Moreover, pretrial discovery and
jury trials are precisely the kind of litigation features that U.S. civil litigation
generally entails and that the FAA purposefully permits parties to avoid through
arbitration. For state law to mandate these features in arbitration would not
simply constrain party autonomy; it would actually prevent parties’ from avoiding
the very formalities from which arbitration meant to allow them to escape. In any

53

131 S. Ct. at 1749-50.
Volt Info. Servs. v. Bd. of Trustees of Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
55
See generally George A. Bermann, Ascertaining the Parties’ Intentions in Arbitral
Design, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1013 (2009).
56
According to Justice Scalia, class arbitration “is not arbitration as envisioned by the
FAA, lacks its benefits, and therefore may not be required by state law.” 131 S. Ct. at
1753. What Justice Scalia was probably saying is not that class arbitration is not
arbitration, but that it changes the nature of arbitration. Id. at 1748 (“[r]equiring the
availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration
and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA”). Professor Rau rightly cautions
against over-reading Justice Scalia’s remark. Rau, at 479 (reading the remark as
suggesting that “the arbitrators’ imposition of a class-wide proceeding was so far outside
the scope of the probable expectations of the contracting parties, and in consequence
would so drastically alter the cost/benefit calculus of their original decision to arbitrate,
that their agents should not have taken it upon themselves to do so – not, at least, without
some further indicia of the parties’ agreement”).
57
131 S. Ct. at 1747.
54
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event, California law did not mandate class arbitration. As noted above,58 under
Stolt-Nielsen, an arbitration agreement will only be read to authorize class
arbitration if there is positive evidence that the parties contemplated arbitration of
that sort. Moreover, class adjudication, though permissible in U.S. civil litigation,
is by no means one of its standard features. In the U.S. litigation system, parties
ordinarily litigate on an individual basis, proceeding on a class basis only if and
when certain exceptional preconditions are satisfied.
The reasoning of the majority in Concepcion is flawed not merely because it
mistakenly treats class arbitration as lying beyond the realm of arbitration (which
it does not) and because it mistakenly assumes that California law imposes class
arbitration on the parties (which it does not). It is even more fundamentally
flawed. California’s application of unconscionability to class-arbitration waivers
does not in fact discriminate against arbitration, however one looks at it.
California law treats countless other types of contractual waivers as fundamentally
unfair and unenforceable; class-arbitration waivers are hardly alone in that regard.
To insulate them from standard unconscionability analysis under California
contract law would amount, if anything, to discriminating in their favor, which the
FAA certainly does not require. The FAA guarantees that arbitration agreements
will be treated on an equal footing as compared to other contracts; it does not
guarantee that they will be treated better.59
California law’s neutrality becomes still further evident if we compare its
policy on waiver of class arbitration with its policy on waiver of class litigation.
From this perspective, too, California law does not discriminate against
arbitration, since it treats waivers of class litigation and arbitration identically.60
Waivers of both kinds are unenforceable. Relatedly, California’s treatment of
agreements to arbitrate is no less favorable than its treatment of conventional
forum selection clauses. California law generally respects and enforces forum
selection clauses, along the general lines established by the Supreme Court in
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.61 However, it rejects such clauses when they are
found, under all the circumstances, to be substantively and procedurally unfair.62
California law thus treats arbitration agreements and forum selection clauses in
58

See note 32 supra, and accompanying text.
Justice Thomas, concurring, would treat the FAA as immunizing arbitration
agreements from challenges to their substantive terms. 131 S. Ct. at 1755.
60
The Concepcions made precisely this argument, 131 S. Ct. at 1746, citing America
Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr 2d 699, 711-13 (Cal. App. 2001)
(unavailability of class-action relief is sufficient in and by itself to preclude enforcement
of a forum selection clause). In fact the California Supreme Court, in adopting its position
on class-arbitration waivers in the Discover Bank case, expressly relied on America
Online. On the non-discriminatory character of the class-arbitration waiver bar, see
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1758-59.
61
407 U.S. 1 (1972).
62
See CQL Original Products, Inc. v. National Hockey League Players’ Assn.,
39 Cal. App. 4th 1347, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 412 (1995); Hall v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. App.
3d 411, 197 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1983).
59
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comparable fashion. I conclude that the majority in Concepcion simply had
insufficient evidence of discriminatory intent or effect to justify barring California
from applying its standard unconscionability doctrine to class-arbitration waivers
and that, in ruling as it did, exacted an unjustifiably high price in federalism
terms.63
Though Concepcion probably represents a more serious threat to established
arbitration law than either Rent-A-Center or Stolt-Nielsen, its significance, too,
should not be exaggerated. Certainly, under Concepcion, courts cannot deny
enforcement of class-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as categorically
unconscionable under state law. However, some lower courts have held that
arbitration agreements containing class-action waivers may still be analyzed under
the particular facts and circumstances established, and thus have granted or denied
enforcement on a strictly case-by-case basis.64 They have accordingly held an
arbitration agreement containing a class-arbitration waiver to be unenforceable,
not because of the waiver per se, but because the arbitration clause, including the
waiver, was generally “confusing and unfair”65 or because the arbitration
agreement contained other provisions alongside the waiver that rendered it
unconscionable.66

63

See Stipanowich, Section III C 3. See also Rau, at 534-35. However, Professor
Rau expresses doubt that the requirements of the FAA are satisfied merely because no
discrimination against agreements to arbitrate, as distinct from contracts generally, can be
shown. Id. at 536-37.
64
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Fisher, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124839, at *20-21 (D. Md.
Oct. 28, 2011); Brown v. Ralph’s Grocery Company, 197 Cal. App. 4th 489, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 854 (2011); Plows v. Rockwell Collins, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88781, at
*10-12 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2011); Tory v. First Premier Bank, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
110126, at * 9-13 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2011).
The court in Fisher, supra, relied on the Eleventh Circuit decision in Cruz v.
Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205, 1214-15 (11th Cir. 2011). In Cruz, the court
enforced a class-action waiver because the consumer had based the unconscionability
argument on the very same ground advanced in Concepcion, namely that the case
involved numerous small-dollar claims by consumers against a corporation, many of
which could only be brought on a class basis. But the court implied that a different and
stronger showing might have produced a different result. See also Lewis v. UBS Fin.
Servs., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116433, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2011).
But see Kaltwasser v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106783, at *17
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011), stating that “it is incorrect to read Concepcion as allowing
plaintiffs to avoid arbitration agreements on a case-by-case basis simply by providing
individualized evidence about the costs and benefits at stake.”
65
Williams v. Securitas Security Servs USA, Inc, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75502, at
*9-10 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 2011).
66
In re Checking Acct Overdraft Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118462, at *48-69
(S.D. Fla. Sept. 1, 2011) (arbitration agreement’s fee-shifting provisions, which
accompanied a class-action waiver, render arbitration agreement unconscionable and
unenforceable).
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The recent Chen-Oster case67 is particularly revealing in this regard. There, a
federal magistrate declined to enforce an arbitration agreement on the ground that
depriving the plaintiffs of access to a class-arbitration remedy would seriously
impair enjoyment of the federal statutory rights conferred by Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, and, when specifically asked to reconsider that decision in light
of Concepcion, declined to do so.68 Significantly, the arbitration agreement in
Obviously, with or without a class-arbitration waiver in the mix, an arbitration
agreement may be examined for its conscionability on the basis of other of its features –
taken alone or in combination – and be granted or denied enforcement accordingly. See,
e.g., Alvarez v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146757, at *16 (E.D. Cal.
Dec. 21, 2011), stating that “[i]n the wake of Concepcion, the decision has been
interpreted to bar challenges to arbitration agreements on the grounds that they contain
class action waivers, but not to prevent courts from considering other unconscionability
arguments that do not ‘interfere[] with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus
create[] a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.’” See also Carrell v. L&S Plumbing Pshp.,
Ltd, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84391, at *10-14 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2011) (considering on
the facts whether arbitration agreement is unenforceable due to provisions requiring that
arbitration be held in an inconvenient venue and that each party bear an equal share of the
expenses, regardless of outcome); Davis v. Global Client Solutions, LLC, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 116063, at * 7-13 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 6, 2011) (considering effect on conscionability
of arbitration clause of various factors, including timing of receipt, limitation on remedies,
exculpatory clauses, fine print, and other party’s right to select the arbitrator); In re
DirecTV Early Cancellation Fee Mktg and Sales Practices Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
102027, at *26-27 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2011) (court considers and rejects claim of
unconscionability based on lack of mutuality between the parties); Palmer v. Infosys Tech.
Ltd., Inc, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130104, at *14 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 9, 2011) (same);
Kanbar v. O’Melveny & Myers, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79447, at *15-24 (N.D. Cal. July
21, 2011) (court finds arbitration agreement unconscionable due to its containing a short
limitations period, a requirement of confidentiality and a right of the economically
stronger party to resort to court on certain issues; a refusal to enforce these provisions is
not anti-arbitration); Daugherty v. Encana Oil & Gas (USA), Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
76802, at *31-34 (D. Colo. July 15, 2011) (requirement that plaintiffs pay one-half of the
total fees and costs of arbitration effectively precludes them from pursuing their claims
and is unconscionable).
67
Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 785 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D. N.Y. 2011). The
court relied on In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation, 634 F.3d 187 (2d Cir.
2011), where the court found that bringing individual arbitrations would be prohibitively
expensive. It declined to enforce the class-arbitration waiver, but rather than compel
arbitration on an individual basis, treated the arbitration agreement as unenforceable
altogether, paving the way for class litigation instead.
68
Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73200 (S.D.N.Y.
July 7, 2011). To the same effect, see Raniere v. Citigroup, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
135393, at *37-56 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2011), holding that Concepcion leaves intact the
authority of courts to deny enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate if remitting the parties
to arbitration would effectively deprive them of important statutory rights, as established
in cases such as American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 634 F.3d 187, 199 (2d Cir.
2011) (“American Express II”). See also Ragone v. Atlantic Video at the Manhattan
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Chen-Oster did not contain a class-arbitration waiver. The majority had simply
read the agreement as barring class arbitration under Stolt-Nielsen on account of
its silence on the matter.
III. CONCLUSION
There can be no question that a Supreme Court majority has eliminated
important safeguards central to the legitimacy of arbitration, particularly in the
consumer contract context.69 What is remarkable is not only what the majority
has accomplished, but the extent to which its accomplishment required that it turn
its back on some of the most basic and, up to now, enduring, principles of the U.S.
law of arbitration. The majority’s candor in its solicitude for certain economic
interests in the arbitration context70 and its hostility to class arbitration71 is not
matched with candor in its disregard of established understandings about
arbitration under U.S. law.
And yet, despite the clarity of what Professors Stipanowich and Rau depict as
a virtual campaign against values of consumer welfare in the context of
Center, 595 F.3d 115, 125-26 (2d Cir. 2010); D’Antuono v. Service Road Corp., 789 F.
Supp. 2d 308, 322 (D. Conn. 2011) (same); Urbino v. Orkin Servs. of Calif., Inc, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114746, at *33-40 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2011) (enforcing class-action
waiver would frustrate purposes of California’s Labor Code Private Attorneys General
Act (PAGA); Daugherty v. Encana Oil & Gas (USA), Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76802,
at *32-34 (D. Colo. July 15, 2011) (arbitration clause’s fee-shifting provisions undermines
purposes of Fair Labor Standards Act and is unenforceable).
69
According to Professor Stipanowich, “in its zeal to further its evolving vision of the
FAA the Court has eliminated key safeguards aimed at ensuring fundamental fairness to
consumers and employees in arbitration,” thus revealing the Court’s “largely unmitigated
pro-arbitration stance.” Stipanowich, at 327, 433. (The court subsequently denied the
motion by Goldman, Sachs to dismiss the complaint in Chen-Oster on the ground that the
plaintiff had raised exclusively individual claims in her administrative complaint before
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112294 (S.D.
N.Y. Sept. 29, 2011)).
70
Justice Scalia writes:
[C]lass arbitration greatly increases risks to defendants. Informal procedures do
of course have a cost: The absence of multilayered review makes it more likely
that errors will go uncorrected. Defendants are willing to accept the costs of these
errors in arbitration, since their impact is limited to the size of individual
disputes, and presumably outweighed by savings from avoiding the courts. But
when damages allegedly owed to tens of thousands of potential claimants are
aggregated and decided at once, the risk of an error will often become
unacceptable. Faced with even a small chance of a devastating loss, defendants
will be pressured into settling questionable claims. Other courts have noted the
risk of “in terrorem” settlements that class actions entail, and class arbitration
would be no different.
131 S. Ct. at 1752.
71
Id. at 1751-52.
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arbitration, none of the decisions in the trilogy – whether viewed alone or in
tandem with the others – has dealt a decisive blow to those values. Advocates and
courts can continue in good conscience to pursue those values in the arbitration
context, though they must navigate with extreme caution to avoid the various
roadblocks that the latest trilogy of Supreme Court decisions has erected along
that path.72 But careful navigation is nothing new in the practice of advocates and
judges within the American legal system.
Still, there is ultimately something deeply unwholesome about the entire
enterprise that we are observing. On the one hand, the Court is pursuing a proarbitration philosophy at the expense not only of consumer welfare, but also of
some of U.S. arbitration law’s most basic understandings. On the other hand,
consumer advocates respond in kind, resisting the jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court majority, if need be through argumentation and advocacy that is frankly no
less strained than the majority’s jurisprudence itself.73 The trilogy of cases,
coupled with the reactions triggered, offers the best evidence to date that, whether
subjecting consumer cases to pre-dispute arbitration agreements is good or bad for
consumers,74 it is not particularly good for arbitration.

72

Professor Rau nicely describes the navigation to which I refer:
The nicer and fussier and more discriminating the conceptual inquiry . . . the
wider, in consequence, may be the opening for manipulation by aggressive
counsel and recalcitrant judges.
Rau, at 522.
73
See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and
the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420 (2008).
74
In any event, the U.S. remains somewhat out of line with the dominant world trend
restricting the enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer as well as
employment contracts.
However, see the numerous legislative proposals limiting the enforceability of predispute arbitration agreements in the consumer and employment settings. Stipanowich, at
397 n.450. Among those enacted are the 2010 Department of Defense Appropriations
Act, H.R. 3326, 111th Cong. (2010) (non-waivability of right to a judicial forum for Title
VII sexual harassment claims of employees of federal government contractors), and the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (non-waivability of right to
a judicial forum for claims under the Act by employee whistleblowers and nonarbitrability of claims against mortgage lenders under the Truth in Lending Act). The
latter enactment (in Secs. 928 and 1028) authorizes the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to
regulate pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the securities industry and the consumer
financial products and services sector, respectively.
The most general enactment would be the Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA), discussed
in Stipanowich, at 400-04, which in its latest iteration renders unenforceable pre-dispute
arbitration agreements concerning employment, consumer and civil rights disputes.
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011), H.R. 1873, 112th Cong.
(2011).

